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Abstract
A public decision model speciﬁes a ﬁxed set of alternatives A, a variable
population, and a ﬁxed set of admissible preferences over A, common to all
agents. We study the implications, for any social choice function, of the princi-
ple of solidarity, in the class of all such models. The principle says that when
the environment changes, all agents not responsible for the change should all
be aﬀected in the same direction: either all weakly win, or all weakly lose. We
consider two formulations of this principle: population-monotonicity (Thom-
son, 1983); and replacement-domination (Moulin, 1987). Under weak addi-
tional requirements, but regardless of the domain of preferences considered,
each of the two conditions implies (i) coalition-strategy-proofness; (ii) that
the choice only depends on the set of preferences that are present in the so-
ciety and not on the labels of agents, nor on the number of agents having a
particular preference; (iii) that there exists a status quo point, i.e. an alterna-
tive always weakly Pareto-dominated by the alternative selected by the rule.
We also prove that replacement-domination is generally at least as strong as
population-monotonicity.
Key words. Population-monotonicity, replacement-domination, solidarity,
strategy-proofness, coalition-strategy-proofness, public decision, status quo.
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1 Introduction
Several authors have studied the implications of solidarity conditions in particular
models of pure public choice.1 This paper uniﬁes results obtained in each of these
particular models into a general theory, applicable to a large class of pure public
decision models.
Solidarity is a general principle of justice. It says that when circumstances
change, all agents not responsible for the change should all be aﬀected in the same
direction: either they all weakly win, or they all weakly loose. We investigate
here two particular formulations of this principle. Population-monotonicity (Thom-
son, 1983a, 1983b) applies to the arrival and departure of agents. Replacement-
domination (Moulin, 1987) applies to changes in preferences. We restrict attention
to models of pure public decision.2
A model of public decision speciﬁes a ﬁxed set of alternatives A, a variable
population, and a ﬁxed common set of admissible preferences over A. This deﬁnition
implies the three following important assumptions. (i) The set of alternatives A is
ﬁxed and does not depend on the population. (ii) Each admissible preference is
deﬁned over the ﬁxed set A. (iii) The set of admissible preferences is common to
all agents and ﬁxed.
In particular, alternatives are “anonymous”, in the sense that they do not contain
agent-speciﬁc provisions, such as transfers, or the allocation of commodity bundles
to particular agents, and that the set of admissible preferences is the same for
each agent. This excludes any resource allocation problem with any type of private
1See [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [21] , [27] and [25] .
2Besides models of public decision, population-monotonicity and replacement-domination have
been studied in a very large number of contexts, including baragaining theory, coalitional games,
quasi-linear cost allocation problems, fair allocation in economies with private goods, with pro-
duction, with individible objects, and with single-peaked-preferences. For a survey on population-
monotonicity, see Thomson (1995) and Thomson (1999b). For a survey on replacement-domination,
see Thomson (1999a).
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consumption, or phenomena such as crowding.
For example, the citizens of a nation choose the location of their capital, the
colors and design of the national ﬂag, the philosophical and moral principles under-
lying the Constitution and the laws governing the nation. A company’s executives
and board choose a name, an image, etc.
Pure public decision models also serve as benchmarks in the study of models
of non-pure public decision, for situations where assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) can
only be thought of as approximations.
All existing studies on solidarity conditions in pure public choice rely on a partic-
ular underlying geometric structure. For example, Thomson (1993) and Ching and
Thomson (1997) model the set of alternatives as a segment over which agents have
single-peaked preferences (see section 2). Other models depart from this benchmark
by analyzing diﬀerent underlying geometric structures. Our starting point is the ob-
servation that, although, in each of these models, solidarity conditions characterize
a certain model-speciﬁc class of social choice functions, many properties common to
all these functions do not depend on the geometry, nor on any other speciﬁcity of
the model. As we show, solidarity conditions, together with weak additional require-
ments, have the same implications in any model of pure public decision, regardless
of its speciﬁc underlying geometry, and regardless of any other type of speciﬁcity in
the model.
In this paper, we ﬁrst establish that solidarity with respect to changes in pref-
erences is generally a stronger requirement than solidarity with respect to the
arrival and departure of agents, in the following sense. Any social choice func-
tion f for a pure public choice problem (with a variable population), that sat-
isﬁes replacement-domination, together with weak additional conditions, must be
population-monotonic (section 4). In addition, any social choice function f for a
pure public choice problem, that satisﬁes at least one of our conditions of solidarity,
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together with weak additional conditions, must have the following properties. (a)
The decision only depends on which preferences are represented in the population
by at least one agent, not on how many agents represent each of these preferences,
nor on their labels. In other words, neither labels nor numbers matter (section
4). We call this property “represented-types-only”. (b) The social function admits
at least one status quo point, i.e. an alternative always Pareto-dominated by the
choice of the function (section 5). In particular, whenever the status quo point is
Pareto-eﬃcient, either it is chosen, or an alternative Pareto-indiﬀerent to it is se-
lected. (c) The social choice function satisﬁes coalition-strategy-proofness, which
means that no coalition of agents can manipulate the choice so as to beneﬁt all
members of the coalition (section 6). In particular, it satisﬁes the weaker condition
of strategy-proofness.
We prove that all these implications are general. They hold regardless of the
speciﬁcs of the particular model under consideration, such as the cardinality of the
set of alternatives, the cardinality of the set of admissible preferences, the richness
of this set, and whether or not it has any kind of geometric structure. In particular,
single-peakedness of the preferences is not required for any of the above implications
to hold. Even completeness of the preferences is not required for most of them to
hold. We then turn to the particular geometric models studied in the literature
on pure public decisions (section 7). We show that in almost all of these models,
(existing or new) characterizations of solidarity can be obtained as corollaries of our
previously listed general implications of solidarity. Last, we verify that no further
unexpected general logical relations hold among the conditions we study (section
8).
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2 A class of models
Let A be a set of alternatives, ﬁnite or inﬁnite, with generic element denoted by
a. Let N be an inﬁnite set of potential agents with generic agent denoted by i.
This set can be either countable or uncountable. A population is a non-empty
ﬁnite subset N ⊂ N of the set of potential agents. This set can be interpreted as
the set of agents actually present in the economy. Agents have preferences over the
alternatives. A preference R is a binary relation on A that is reﬂexive and transitive.
We do not require preferences to be complete. We say that two alternatives a and
b are comparable for the preference R if either a R b or b R a. Let P and I be the
associated strict preference and indiﬀerence relations. Preferences may be restricted
to belong to a certain set, which represents the constraints imposed on the model by
the situation to which the model applies. One important assumption is that these
constraints aﬀect all agents in a symmetric way, so that this set is common to all
agents. Throughout the paper, let R be a set of admissible preferences, common
to all agents. A pure public choice model with a variable population is a triple
(N , A,R) .
For all population N, a preference proﬁle for N is a list RN = (Ri)i∈N ∈ RN of
|N | preferences indexed by N. Let U (R) be the union of all RN for all (non-empty
and ﬁnite) populations N. This is the set of all admissible preference proﬁles, for all
populations. A choice function f prescribes an outcome for any population and any
proﬁle of admissible preferences. It is a therefore a mapping
f : U (R)→ A.
Our critical assumptions in the above setup are the following. (i) The set of
alternatives A is ﬁxed and does not depend on the population. (ii) Each preference
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R ∈ R is deﬁned over the ﬁxed set A. (iii) The set of admissible preferences R is
common to all agents and ﬁxed. This excludes in particular any resource allocation
problem with any type of private consumption, or phenomena such as crowding.
We do not impose any additional assumptions on A and R. In particular, these sets
may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Preferences may or may be geometric structured, and may
or may not satisfy regularity assumptions.
3 Conditions
To deﬁne our conditions, it is useful to deﬁne the Pareto-domination relation. For all
RN ∈ U (R) , let a weakly Pareto-dominate b for RN , if for all i ∈ N, we have a Ri b.
This is denoted a RN b. Let a and b be Pareto-indiﬀerent for RN if for all i ∈ N, we
have a Ii b. This is denoted a IN b. Let a Pareto-dominate b if a RN b and not a IN
b. This is denoted by a PN b. Let a ∈ A be Pareto-eﬃcient for RN if there exists no
b ∈ A such that b PN a. The Pareto solution is the correspondence Π : U (R) A
that assigns to each proﬁle RN the set of Pareto-eﬃcient alternatives for RN . A
highly desirable property, for a social choice function is that, for any proﬁle, the
function select a Pareto-eﬃcient outcome for this proﬁle.
A social choice function f satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency if for all RN ∈ U (R) , we
have f (RN ) ∈ Π(RN ) .
Let us now present two formulations of the principle of solidarity. The princi-
ple says that when changes in the economy occur, all agents who are not directly
responsible for these changes should be aﬀected in the same direction: either they
all weakly win or they all weakly loose. The ﬁrst formulation applies to changes in
population. It says that when a new agent joins the economy, the agents who were
present before the change and whose preferences were kept ﬁxed should all weakly
loose, or they should all weakly win.
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A social choice function f satisﬁes population-monotonicity if, for all proﬁle
RN ∈ U (R), for all agent i ∈ N \N , and for all preference R′i ∈ R, either we have
f (R′i, RN ) RN f (RN ) , or we have f (RN ) RN f (R
′
i, RN ).
If f is Pareto-eﬃcient, the choice f (RN ) is Pareto-eﬃcient for the initial proﬁle
RN , and an increase in population by exactly one agent cannot lead to a Pareto-
improvement for RN . From this observation, it follows that population-monotonicity
and Pareto-eﬃciency generally imply the following stronger condition.
A social choice function f satisﬁes population-monotonicity+ if, for all two
proﬁles RN , R′M ∈ U (R) satisfying M ∩N = ∅, we have f (RN ) RN f (R′M , RN ) .
Lemma 1 Let f be a social choice function that satisﬁes population-monotonicity
and Pareto-eﬃciency. Then it satisﬁes population-monotonicity+.
Proof. Let RN , R′M ∈ U (R) satisfying M ∩ N = ∅. Let i ∈ M. By population-
monotonicity, either f (R′i, RN ) RN f (RN ) or f (RN ) RN f (R
′
i, RN ) . Since we
have f (RN ) ∈ Π(RN ) , the previous statement implies f (RN ) RN f (R′i, RN ) .
Introducing one-by-one each of the agents in M , we obtain the desired conclusion.
The second formulation of the principle of solidarity applies to a change in the
preference of exactly one agent within a same population. It says that when the
preference of one agent changes, all the other agents whose preferences are kept ﬁxed
should either all weakly loose or they should all weakly win.
A social choice function f satisﬁes replacement-domination if, for all proﬁle
RN ∈ U (R), for all agent i ∈ N \N , and for all two preferences R′i, R′′i ∈ R, either
f (R′i, RN ) RN f (R
′′
i , RN ) or f (R
′′
i , RN ) RN f (R
′
i, RN ).
We will study separately the implications of each of these two formulations of
the principle of solidarity. Population-monotonicity restricts the behavior of a social
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choice function f across populations, but replacement-domination does not require
any sort of consistency across populations. Since in our model, the population is
variable, it is natural, when studying replacement-domination to impose a condition
that restricts the social choice across populations with similar compositions. For all
RN , R
′
M ∈ U (R) , we say that R′M is a replica of RN if there exists an integer k
such that for all preference R ∈ R, the number of agents in R′M having preference
R is exactly k times the number of agents in RN having the same preference R, i.e.
|{j ∈ M : R′h = R}| = k |{i ∈ N : Ri = R}| . Our next condition, which we use when
studying replacement-domination requires a social choice function to select, up to
Pareto-indiﬀerence, the same alternative for any economy an all of its replicas.
A social choice function f satisﬁes replication-indiﬀerence if, for all proﬁles
RN , R
′
M ∈ U (R) such that R′M is a replica of RN , we have f (RN ) IN f (R′M ) .
In particular, this condition restricts a social choice function to select, up to
Pareto-indiﬀerence, the same alternative for any two economy such that one is ob-
tained from the other by relabeling agents. This last weaker requirement is the
condition of anonymity.
A social choice function f satisﬁes anonymity if, for all RN , R′M ∈ U (R) such
that R′M is a replica of RN and such that |M | = |N | , we have f (RN ) IN f (R′M ) .
In this paper, we investigate the implications of population-monotonicity and
Pareto-eﬃciency on the one hand, and replacement-domination, Pareto-eﬃciency
and replication-indiﬀerence, on the other hand. The next three sections are devoted
to an analysis of the implications of each of these two combinations of axioms.
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4 Represented-types-only
In this section, we obtain two types of results. First, we observe that solidarity and
additional conditions imply represented-types-only, a signiﬁcantly stronger indiﬀer-
ence condition than anonymity (Lemma 2). Represented-types-only requires that the
choice for any proﬁle only depend on the preferences that are present in the proﬁle,
not on the labels or number of the agents who have each of these preferences, up to
Pareto-indiﬀerence for these preferences. Second, we establish a general relation be-
tween the two solidarity conditions. We prove that replacement-domination together
with Pareto-eﬃciency and replication-indiﬀerence implies population-monotonicity,
regardless of the set of admissible preferences (Theorem 1). This establishes as a gen-
eral result the observed pattern, in the literature on solidarity in public decision mod-
els, that replacement-domination is at least as strong as population-monotonicity.
A social choice function f satisﬁes represented-types-only if, for all RN , R′M ∈
U (R) such that {Ri : i ∈ N} = {R′h : h ∈ M} , we have f (RN ) IN f (R′M ) .
Lemma 2 Let f satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency. (i) If f satisﬁes population-monotonicity,
then it satisﬁes represented-types-only. (ii) If f satisﬁes replacement-domination
and replication-indiﬀerence, then it satisﬁes represented-types-only.
Proof. Implication (i) Let RN , R′M ∈ U (R) such that {Ri : i ∈ N} = {R′i : i ∈ M} .
Let R′′L ∈ U (R) satisfying L ∩ N = ∅ and L ∩ M = ∅ and {R′′h : h ∈ N ′′} =
{Ri : i ∈ N} . By population-monotonicity+, we have f (RN ) RN f (R′′L, RN ) . Since
f (R′′L, RN ) ∈ Π(R′′L, RN ) = Π (RN ) , we have in fact f (RN ) IN f (R′′L, RN ) . Re-
producing three times the same argument, we obtain f (R′′L, RN ) I
′′
L f (R
′′
L) , f (R
′′
L)
I ′′L f (R
′′
L, R
′
M ) and f (R
′′
L, R
′
M ) I
′
M f (R
′
M ) . Since IN , I
′
M and I
′′
L deﬁne the same
transitive relation, we have f (RN ) IN f (R′M ) , the desired conclusion.
Implication (ii) . Let RN , R′M ∈ U (R) such that {Ri : i ∈ N} = {R′i : i ∈ M} .
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Let L be a population such that |L| = |N | |M | . Let RL,RL ∈ RL such that RL is a
replica of RN and RL is a replica of R′M . By replication-indiﬀerence, we have f (RN )
IN f (RL) and f (R′M ) I
′
M f
(
RL
)
. There exists a natural integer K and a sequence
{
RkL
}K
k=0
of proﬁles in RL satisfying the following four conditions: (i) R0L = RL,
RKL = RL. (ii) For all k = 0, ...,K, we have
{
Rkh : h ∈ L
}
= {Ri : i ∈ N} . (iii) For
all k = 0, ...,K, for all R ∈ R, we have ∣∣{h ∈ L : Rkh = R
}∣∣ ≥ 2 |{i ∈ N : Ri = R}| .
(iv) for all k = 0, ...,K − 1, the proﬁles RkL and Rk+1L only diﬀer by the preference
of exactly one agent h (k). Consider such a sequence. For all k = 0, ...,K − 1,
by replacement-domination, either f
(
Rk+1L
)
RkL\h(k) f
(
Rk
)
, or f
(
Rk
)
RkL\h(k)
f
(
Rk+1L
)
. By conditions (ii) and (iii) , this statement is equivalent to the con-
dition that either f
(
Rk+1L
)
RN f
(
RkL
)
, or f
(
RkL
)
RN f
(
Rk+1L
)
. Since both
f
(
RkL
) ∈ Π (RkL
)
= Π(RN ) and f
(
Rk+1L
)
∈ Π
(
Rk+1L
)
= Π(RN ) , we obtain
f
(
RkL
)
IN f
(
Rk+1L
)
, for all k = 0, ...,K − 1. Since IN and I ′M deﬁne the same
transitive relation, we have f (RN ) IN f (R′M ) , the desired conclusion.
As an immediate corollary of Lemma 2, under Pareto-eﬃciency, population-
monotonicity implies anonymity. Observe that replication-indiﬀerence alone implies
anonymity, but in general, it does not imply represented-types-only.
Theorem 1 Let f satisfy replacement-domination. Suppose further that f satisﬁes
either (i) represented-types-only, or (ii) Pareto-eﬃciency and replication-indiﬀerence.
Then f satisﬁes population-monotonicity.
Proof. By Lemma 2, it suﬃces to prove case (i). Let RN ∈ U (R), let i ∈ N\N , and
R′i ∈ R. Let j ∈ N and deﬁne R′′i := Rj . First, by represented-types-only, f (RN )
IN f (R′′i , RN ) . Second, by replacement-domination applied to proﬁles (R
′′
i , RN )
and (R′i, RN ), either f (R
′′
i , RN ) RN f (R
′
i, RN ) or f (R
′
i, RN ) RN f (R
′′
i , RN ) . Since
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f (RN ) IN f (R′′i , RN ) , we obtain that either f (RN ) RN f (R
′
i, RN ) , or f (R
′
i, RN )
RN f (RN ) , the desired conclusion.
Do the conditions of population-monotonicity and Pareto-eﬃciency conversely
imply replacement-domination? The answer is no. Miyagawa (1998, 2001), Ehlers
(2002, 2003) and Gordon (2003) each provide models that disprove this claim. In
each of these models, the set of social functions satisfying population-monotonicity
and Pareto-eﬃciency strictly contains the set of functions satisfying replacement-
domination, Pareto-eﬃciency and replication-indiﬀerence.
5 Status quo points
An alternative a∗ is a status quo point for a social function f if a∗ is always weakly
Pareto-dominated (for the relevant preference proﬁle) by any alternative selected by
f . In other words, a∗ ∈ A is a status quo point for f , if for all RN ∈ U (R) , we have
f (RN ) RN a∗.
This deﬁnition implies, in particular, that if a∗ is a status quo point for f, then
either a∗ or an alternative that is Pareto-indiﬀerent to a∗ is selected whenever a∗ is
Pareto-eﬃcient. Following the deﬁnition, the set of status quo points for f is
⋂
RN∈U(R)
{a ∈ A : f (RN ) RN a} .
For a general social function f , this set may contain more than one element, and it
may also be empty. Our main results in this section say that, in any model (A,R)
satisfying certain minimal requirements, if f satisﬁes one of the solidarity conditions
and additional weak assumptions, then f admits at least one such point. To state
the ﬁrst result of this type, we need the following deﬁnition. Given a topology T on
A, a preference Ri over A is lower-hemi-continuous for T if, for all b ∈ A, the set
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{a ∈ A : b Ri a} is closed for T .
Theorem 2 Suppose that there exists a compact topology T on A such that all pref-
erences in R are lower-hemi-continuous for T . Let f satisfy either (i) population-
monotonicity+ and anonymity; or (ii) population-monotonicity and Pareto-eﬃciency;
or (iii) replacement-domination, Pareto-eﬃciency and replication-indiﬀerence. Then
f admits at least one status quo point.
Proof. By Lemmas 1 and 2, and Theorem 1, it suﬃces to prove that (i) is suﬃcient.
First, we show that for any ﬁnite subcollection C ⊆ U (R) , the intersection
⋂
R∈C
{a ∈ A : f (RN ) RN a}
is nonempty. Let {RNk}Kk=1 be such a collection. For each k = 1, ...,K, let Mk be a
population with cardinality |Nk| that does not contain any agents from M1, ...,Mk−1.
For each k = 1, ...,K, let R′Mk ∈ RMk be a proﬁle obtained by relabelling each
agent in proﬁle RNk , while keeping its preference ﬁxed. By anonymity, for each
k = 1, ...,K, we have f
(
R′Mk
)
INk f (RNk) . Let M = M1 ∪ ... ∪ Mk and R′M =(
R′M1 , ..., R
′
MK
)
. By population-monotonicity+, for each k = 1, ...,K, we have
f
(
R′Mk
)
R′Mk f (R
′
M ) , and thus f
(
R′Mk
)
RNk f (R
′
M ) since R
′
Mk
and RNk deﬁne the
same relation. Thus for all k = 1, ...,K, we have f (RNk) RNk f (R
′
M ) . Thus f (R
′
M )
is an element of the above ﬁnite intersection for the family {RNk}Kk=1, which is there-
fore nonempty. Since each preference in R is lower-hemi-continuous, then each set
{a ∈ A : f (RN ) RN a} is closed for T . Thus {{a ∈ A : f (RN ) RN a} : R ∈ U (R)}
is a collection of closed sets that satisﬁes the ﬁnite intersection property. Since T is
compact, then the set of status quo points of f is nonempty.
The existence of a topology satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3 should be
understood as a joint condition on A and R. Indeed, when such a topology exists,
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then the topology T ∗ generated by the collection
{A\ {a ∈ A : b Ri a} : Ri ∈ R, b ∈ A} ,
is compact. All preferences in R are lower-hemi-continuous for this topology. There-
fore the conditions on A and R in Theorem 3 can be replaced by the compacity of
T ∗. These conditions are also equivalent to the condition that any subcollection of
the above collection admit a ﬁnite subcollection that covers A. When A is ﬁnite,
the conditions on (A,R) in Theorem 2 are obviously satisﬁed. We thus have the
following result.
Corollary 1 Let A be ﬁnite. Let f satisfy either (i) population-monotonicity+ and
anonymity, (ii) population-monotonicity and Pareto-eﬃciency, or (iii) replacement-
domination, Pareto-eﬃciency and replication-indiﬀerence. Then f admits a status
quo point.
When A is inﬁnite, but R is ﬁnite (and the conditions on (A,R) of Theorem 2
are violated), then conditions (ii) or (iii) of Theorem 2 are still suﬃcient for the
existence of a status quo point for f . In fact, we will prove a stronger result in
Theorem 3.
At this point, a few remarks are in order. First, it is clear that under the general
assumptions of Theorem 2, the status quo point need not be unique. Second, there
are models (A,R) (even satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 2) such that all social
choice functions (not necessarily satisfying solidarity) admit a trivial status quo
point, and for which Theorem 2 holds in a trivial way. For an example illustrating
both remarks, suppose that A contains an element a∗ that is at least weakly worse
than all other elements in A for all preferences in R, so that a∗ is weakly Pareto-
dominated for R by all other alternatives. Then all social choice functions admit a∗
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as a trivial status quo point. Moreover, if several such alternatives exist, then all
social choice functions admits several trivial status quo points. Third, even under
the assumptions of Theorem 2, a social choice function may admit a unique status
quo point a∗, that is nevertheless Pareto-dominated by another alternative b∗ for
the entire set of admissible preferences. Miyagawa (1998, 2001) studies a particular
model (A,R) that satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 2, where this phenomenon
occurs. The remarks brings up two natural questions. First, under what conditions
is the set of status quo points (at least essentially) a singleton? Second, which
conditions on (A,R) ensure that all social choice functions satisfying our conditions
admit a status quo point not Pareto-dominated by another alternative for the entire
domainR? Our next theorem partially answers both of these questions, by providing
suﬃcient conditions. The following deﬁnition and lemma are useful. For all proﬁles
RL, RN ∈ U (R) , say that the proﬁle RL is at least as rich as RN if for all a, b ∈ A,
(a RL b)⇒ (a RN b) .
Lemma 3 Let f satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency and either (i) population-monotonicity;
or (ii) replacement-domination and replication-indiﬀerence. Then for all R∗L and
RN in U (R) such that R∗L is at least as rich as RN , we have f (RN ) RN f (R∗L) .
Proof. By Theorem 1, it suﬃces to prove that (i) is suﬃcient, which we do
next. Let R′M ∈ U (R) such that M ∩ N = ∅ and {R′i : i ∈ M} = {R∗i : i ∈ L} .
By population-monotonicity+, we have f (R′M ) R
′
M f (R
′
M , RN ) . Since R
∗
L is at
least as rich as RN , then R′M is at least as rich as RN . Therefore f (R
′
M ) RN
f (R′M , RN ) . Since f (R
′
M , RN ) ∈ Π(R′M , RN ) and by the two previous relations, we
have in fact f (R′M , RN ) IN f (R
′
M ) . By population-monotonicity+, we have f (RN )
RN f (R′M , RN ) . By the two previous relations, we have f (RN ) RN f (R
′
M ) . By
represented-types-only, f (R′M ) I
′
M f (R
∗
L) . Since R
′
M is at least as rich as RN , this
implies f (R′M ) IN f (R
∗
L) . Therefore f (RN ) RN f (R
∗
L) .
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An immediate consequence of Lemma 3 is that if f is a social choice function
satisfying the assumptions of the lemma, and RL and RN are equally rich, then
f (RL) and f (RN ) are Pareto-indiﬀerent for both RN and RL. In other words, the
social choice essentially only depends on the richness of the preference proﬁle, an
indiﬀerence property even stronger than represented-types-only.
For all (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) set of preferences R∗, we deﬁne in the obvious way,
by analogy with these notions for a preference proﬁle, the relations of weak-Pareto-
domination for R∗, Pareto-domination for R∗, and Pareto-indiﬀerence for R∗, and
the set Π (R∗) of Pareto-eﬃcient alternatives for R∗. For all two (ﬁnite or inﬁnite)
sets of preferences R′ and R′′, we extend the deﬁnition of the relation ”at least as
rich as” in the obvious way. Observe that when two sets R′ and R′′ are as rich as
each other, then in particular Π (R′) = Π (R′′) .
The following result applies to a set of admissible preferences R that contains
at least one ﬁnite subset as rich as itself. Obviously, any ﬁnite domain R belongs to
this category (proving the theorem in this special case is very easy). In particular,
any model with a ﬁnite set of alternatives A belongs to this category. Other models
in this class are domains that contain two strict preferences such that one is obtained
reversing the other, like the single-peaked domain on a segment.
Theorem 3 Let the set R contain a ﬁnite subset as rich as R. Let f satisfy Pareto-
eﬃciency and either (i) population-monotonicity; or (ii) replacement-domination
and replication-indiﬀerence. Then f admits a status quo point that is Pareto-
eﬃcient for R. This point is unique, up to Pareto-indiﬀerence for R.
Proof. By Theorem 1, it suﬃces to prove that (i) is suﬃcient, which we do next.
Let R∗L ∈ U (R) be a ﬁnite proﬁle as rich as R. Let a∗ := f (R∗L) . Let RN ∈ U (R) .
It is clear that R∗L is at least as rich as RN . Therefore by Lemma 3, f (RN ) RN a
∗.
Since this is true for all RN ∈ U (R) , then a∗ is a status quo point for f. Since R∗L
16
is as rich as R, then Π (R∗L) = Π (R) . Since a∗ ∈ Π(R∗L) , then a∗ ∈ Π(R) . We now
show that a∗ is the unique status quo point for f in Π (R) , up to Pareto-indiﬀerence
for R. Let b∗ such a point. Since b∗ is a status quo point for f, we have a∗ R∗L b∗.
Since R∗L is at least as rich as R, then a∗ weakly Pareto-dominates b∗ for R. Since
b∗ ∈ Π(R) , then a∗ and b∗ are Pareto-indiﬀerent for R, thus a∗ is unique up to
Pareto-indiﬀerence for R.
5.1 Counterexample
The assumptions on (A,R) in Theorems 2 and 3 are weak. We now show that
when they do not hold, the conclusion of the theorem fails. Let A = [0, 1] . For all
a ∈ A, let Ra be the preference relation such that for all x ∈ A we have a P a b and
for all x, y ∈ A\ {a} , we have x Ia y. Let a be the “peak” of preference Ra. Let
R := {Ra : a ∈ A} . For the usual topology on [0, 1] , for which it is a compact set,
none of the preferences in R is lower-hemi-continuous (notice however that they are
all upper-hemi-continuous). In fact, any topology of A for which all preferences in
this domain are lower-hemi-continuous must have all singletons {a} as open sets.
It it clear that such a topology cannot be compact. Therefore the conditions of
Theorem 2 are not satisﬁed. Moreover, the only subset of preferences as rich as R
is R itself, and is not ﬁnite. Therefore the conditions of Theorem 3 are not satisﬁed
either. For all RN ∈ U (R) , the set of Pareto-eﬃcient alternatives for RN is the set
of peaks in proﬁle RN . Therefore, the Pareto set for any proﬁle in U (R) is a ﬁnite
subset of [0, 1]. Let f : U (R) → A that selects the highest peak in [0, 1) whenever
the proﬁle contains at least one peak in this set and otherwise selects 1, when 1 is
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the common peak of all agents in the proﬁle. For all RN ∈ U (R) ,
f (RN ) ≡ max {x ∈ Π(RN ) : x < 1} if {Ri : i ∈ N} =
{
R1
}
f (RN ) ≡ 1 if {Ri : i ∈ N} =
{
R1
}
.
This social choice function is Pareto-eﬃcient and population-monotonic. It even
satisﬁes replacement-domination. But it has no status quo point.
6 Coalition-strategy-proofness
In this section, we analyze the relation between solidarity and the two following
important conditions of robustness to preference manipulation. A social choice
function satisﬁes strategy-proofness if no agent can beneﬁt from misrepresenting
her true preferences, regardless of the preferences reported by all other agents:
For all RN ∈ U (R) , all i /∈ N, all Ri, R′i ∈ R, we do not have f (R′i, RN ) Pi
f (Ri, RN ) .
A social choice function satisﬁes coalition-strategy-proofness if no coalition
of players can jointly beneﬁt from jointly misrepresenting their preferences, regard-
less of the preferences reported by all agents outside the coalition:
For all RN , RM , R′M ∈ U (R) such that M ∩N = ∅, we do not have f (R′M , RN )
PM f (RM , RN ) .
The most important and useful result in this section, Corollary 2, says that in
a domain of complete preferences, under Pareto-eﬃciency, a social choice function
satisﬁes population-monotonicity iﬀ it satisﬁes strategy-proofness and represented-
types-only, and iﬀ it satisﬁes coalition-strategy-proofness and represented-types-only.
For a general set of (not necessarily complete) preferences, only an implication holds,
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which is our ﬁrst result in this section.
Theorem 4 Let f satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency. If f further satisﬁes either (i) population-
monotonicity or (ii) replacement-domination and replication-indiﬀerence, then f is
coalition-strategy-proof.
Proof. By Theorem 1, it suﬃces to prove case (i) . Let RN , RM , R′M ∈ U (R) such
that M ∩N = ∅. We now prove that we do not have f (R′M , RN ) PM f (RM , RN ) .
Let L be a population such that L ∩N = L ∩M = ∅ and |L| = |M | . Let RL ∈ RL
be a proﬁle obtained by relabelling agents in proﬁle RM , while keeping preferences
ﬁxed and let R′L ∈ RL be a proﬁle obtained by relabelling agents in proﬁle R′M ,
while keeping preferences ﬁxed. First, by population-monotonicity+, f (RM , RN )
RM f (R′L, RM , RN ) . By anonymity , f (R
′
L, RM , RN ) IM f (RL, R
′
M , RN ) . There-
fore f (RM , RN ) RM f (RL, R′M , RN ). Second, by population-monotonicity+, we
have f (R′M , RN ) RN f (RL, R
′
M , RN ) and f (R
′
M , RN ) R
′
M f (RL, R
′
M , RN ) . More-
over, since f (RL, R′M , RN ) ∈ Π(RL, R′M , RN ) , it is not the case that f (R′M , RN )
PL f (RL, R′M , RN ) . Since PL and PM deﬁne the same relation, this is equivalent
to say that we do not have f (R′M , RN ) PM f (RL, R
′
M , RN ) . This last statement
and f (RM , RN ) RM f (RL, R′M , RN ) imply that we do not have f (R
′
M , RN ) PM
f (RM , RN ) , the desired conclusion.
When preferences are incomplete, the condition of strategy-proofness can be
strengthen as follows. A social choice function f satisﬁes strong-strategy-proofness
if each agents weakly prefers to report his true preferences, regardless of the prefer-
ences reported by all other agents:
For all RN ∈ U (R) , all i /∈ N, all Ri, R′i ∈ R, we have f (Ri, RN ) Ri f (R′i, RN ) .
Our next result provides a partial converse to Theorem 4.
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Lemma 4 If f satisﬁes strong-strategy-proofness and represented-types-only, then
f satisﬁes population-monotonicity.
Proof. Let RN ∈ U (R), let i ∈ N\N and let R′i ∈ R. We show that f (RN )
RN f (R′i, RN ) . This is shown in two steps. Let j ∈ N and deﬁne Ri := Rj .
First, by represented-types-only, f (RN ) Ij f (Ri, RN ) . Second, by strong-strategy-
proofness, we have f (Ri, RN ) Ri f (R′i, RN ) . Since Ri = Rj , this is in fact equivalent
to f (Ri, RN ) Rj f (R′i, RN ) . This last statement and f (RN ) Ij f (Ri, RN ) imply
that f (RN ) Rj f (R′i, RN ) . Since this holds for all j ∈ N, we obtain f (RN ) RN
f (R′i, RN )the desired conclusion.
In the case where R is a set of complete preferences, this notion and the gen-
erally weaker notion previously deﬁned coincide. Thus for complete preferences,
strong-strategy-proofness can be replaced with strategy-proofness, in Lemma 4. This
observation and Theorem 4 yields the following important equivalence.
Corollary 2 Let R be a set of complete preferences. Let f satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency.
The three following requirements on f are equivalent.
i). Population-monotonicity.
ii). Strategy-proofness and represented-types-only.
iii). Coalition-strategy-proofness and represented-types-only.
When preferences are complete, strategy-proofness and strong-strategy-proofness
coincide, so that together with weak additional conditions, either condition of soli-
darity implies the strong notion, as a consequence of Theorem 5. How much com-
pleteness is needed in the set R for solidarity (together with weak additional as-
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sumptions) to imply3 strong-strategy-proofness? To formulate our next result, we
need the following deﬁnition. A set of preferences R is weakly complete if for all list
of preferences R1, ..., Rk, Rl ∈ R, with l > 1, and for all a ∈ Π (R1, ..., Rl) and all
b ∈ Π (R1, ..., Rk) , such that for all j = 1, ..., k, we have a Rj b then a and b are
comparable for Rl.
Theorem 5 Let R be weakly complete. Let f be a social choice function that
satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency. (i) The social function f is population-monotonic iﬀ
f is strongly-strategy-proof and satisﬁes represented-types-only. (ii) If f satisﬁes
replacement-domination and replication-indiﬀerence, then f is strongly-strategy-proof.
Proof. Equivalence (i). The converse implication is implied by implication (iii)
of Theorem 3 We now prove the direct implication. Let RN ∈ U (R) , let i ∈
N\N and Ri, R′i ∈ R. We now prove that f (Ri, RN ) Ri f (R′i, RN ) . By Theo-
rem 4(i) , f is strategy-proof. Therefore it suﬃces to prove that the two alterna-
tives are comparable for Ri. Let l ∈ N\ (N ∪ {i}) , let R′l := R′i and Rl := Ri.
First, by population-monotonicity+, f (Ri, RN ) Ri f (R′l, Ri, RN ) . By anonymity,
f (R′l, Ri, RN ) Ii f (Rl, R
′
i, RN ) . Together, these two relations yield f (Ri, RN ) Ri
f (Rl, R′i, RN ). Second, by population-monotonicity+, f (R
′
i, RN ) RN f (Rl, R
′
i, RN )
and f (R′i, RN ) R
′
i f (Rl, R
′
i, RN ) . Since f (R
′
i, RN ) ∈ Π(R′i, RN ) , f (Rl, R′i, RN ) ∈
Π(Rl, R′i, RN ) , then by weak-completeness of R, the alternatives f (R′i, RN ) and
f (Rl, R′i, RN ) are comparable for preference Rl = Ri. Since comparability for Ri is
transitive, f (Ri, RN ) and f (R′i, RN ) are comparable for Ri, the desired conclusion.
Implication (ii) follows from equivalence (i) and Theorem 1.
3Similarly, we can deﬁne a stronger notion of coalition-strategy-proofness, that coincides with
the notion used here only when preferences are complete. A second question, analogous to the one
we ask here for strong strategy-proofness, arises for coalition-strategy-proofness. We do not have
an answer to this second question, except that the conditions of Theorem 4 are not suﬃcient (see
also note 5 in section 7).
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For an application of Theorem 5 to a speciﬁc model with incomplete preferences,
see Corollary 8 in the next section.
7 Implications for particular models
In this section, we examine several particular models of pure public choice. In
some of them, solidarity conditions have been studied, in other they have not. We
show that many of the existing results can be obtained as corollaries of the general
implications obtained in this paper and known results on strategy-proofness. We
provide a new characterization on one domain where solidarity was never studied,
the domain of single-plateaued preferences over a segment.
7.1 From strategy-proofness to solidarity
For each of the particular models we consider next, we show how our results in
previous sections yield characterizations of solidarity. In each model, we follow
an identical reasoning, which we explain once and for all. For each model, we
start from an existing characterization of the rules that satisfy strategy-proofness,
Pareto-eﬃciency and possibly another property X. Let F be the class of such rules.
Corollary 2 then tells us that the rules that satisfy population-monotonicity, Pareto-
eﬃciency and X form a subclass G ⊆ F, which is exactly the set of rules in F which,
in addition, satisfy represented-types-only. When F is known, identifying the sub-
class G is very easy. In most cases, the class F can be described as a parametrized
family with a parameter in a certain set. Further imposing represented-types-only
simply further restricts the set of admissible parameters to a subset. Finally, The-
orem 1 tells us that the class of rules that satisfy replacement-domination, Pareto-
eﬃciency and replication-indiﬀerence, and X form a subset H ⊆ G. In many cases,
G and H turn out to be equal, but this is not always the case.
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A natural starting point is to consider the set RGS of all complete strict or-
derings over a set of alternatives AGS containing at least three elements. Solidarity
conditions were never analyzed in this model. Theorem 3 enables us to do it. Unsur-
prinsingly, this leads to a negative result. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)
proved that on such a domain, any social choice rule that satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency
and strategy-proofness must be dictatorial. This well-known result, together with
our Corollary 2 and Theorem 1 implies the following.
Corollary 3 There exists no social choice function U (RGS) → AGS that satis-
ﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity. There is no social choice func-
tion U (RGS) → AGS that satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency, replication-indiﬀerence and
replacement-domination.
This negative result motivates the search for existence results for solidarity con-
ditions on restricted set of admissible preferences. Let A be the interval [0, 1] . A
preference Ri is single-peaked if there is a number p (Ri) ∈ [0, 1] , the “peak”, such
that for all a, b ∈ [0, 1] , if a < b ≤ p (Ri) or p (Ri) ≤ b < a, then b Pi a. Let RSP be
the set of continuous single-peaked preferences over [0, 1] . Moulin (1980), Barbera`
and Jackson (1991) and Ching (1992) characterized a family of rules, called the
generalized median voters schemes, as the social choice functions that are Pareto-
eﬃcient and strategy-proof on this domain. Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thom-
son (1997) deﬁned a subfamily, the target rules. Each rule in this family is identiﬁed
with a target in [0, 1] and is deﬁned as follows. For any population of agents and any
preference proﬁle for these agents, if the target is located between the most extreme
peaks in the proﬁle, the rule selects the target; otherwise, the rule selects among all
peaks in the proﬁle, the one closest to the target. The aforementioned characteriza-
tions of strategy-proofness and Pareto-eﬃciency, together with our Corollary 2 and
Theorem 1, imply the following results.
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Corollary 4 (Ching and Thomson, 1997; Thomson4, 1993). The only social choice
functions U (RSP )→ [0, 1] that satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity
are the target rules. The only social choice functions U (RSP ) → [0, 1] that satisfy
Pareto-eﬃciency, replication-indiﬀerence and replacement-domination are the target
rules.
The above model of social choice on a segment can easily be extended to a more
general setting where the location set A is a tree. Schummer and Vohra (2002)
deﬁne a tree as a “closed connected subset of an Euclidean space, that is composed
of the union of a ﬁnite number of closed lines of ﬁnite length.” The deﬁnition of
single-peaked preferences over a segment naturally extends to a tree. Let AT be a
tree. Let RT be the set of single-peaked preferences over AT . Target rules in this
model are the natural generalization of target rules on a segment. A version of
Corollary 4 was established in the case of a tree, respectively by Klaus (1999, 2001)
and Vohra (1998). Similar results (Corollary 5) are easily obtained as implications
of the characterization of strategy-proof location rules on networks, by Schummer
and Vohra (2002), together with our Corollary 2 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 5 (Klaus, 1999, 2001; Vohra, 1998). The only social choice functions
U (RT ) → AT that satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity are the
target rules. The only social choice functions U (RT ) → AT that satisfy Pareto-
eﬃciency, replication-indiﬀerence and replacement-domination are the target rules.
What if the location set is a cycle? The deﬁnition of single-peaked preferences
over a segment naturally extends to a cycle and to a graphs containing cycles. Let
AG be such a graph and let RG be the set of single-peaked preferences over AG.
Gordon (2003a) proves directly that there are no rules satisfying either solidarity
4Thomson (1993) proves a stronger version of this result, without the requirement of replication-
indiﬀerence and with a ﬁxed population of n ≥ 3 agents.
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condition and Pareto-eﬃciency in this model. Again, this result can be obtained as
an implication of a result by Schummer and Vohra (2002) showing that a strategy-
proof and Pareto-eﬃcient location rule on such a graph must be locally dictatorial,
together with our Corollary 2 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 6 (Gordon, 2003a). There are no social choice functions U (RG) →
AG that satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity. There are no social
choice functions U (RG)→ AG that satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency, replication-indiﬀerence
and replacement-domination.
We now turn to a model in which results on strategy-proofness exist, but noth-
ing is known on solidarity. This is the domain of single-plateaued preferences,
studied by Berga (1998). Let A be the interval [0, 1] . A preference Ri is single-
plateaued if there is are numbers p− (Ri) , p+ (Ri) ∈ [0, 1] , p− (Ri) ≤ p+ (Ri) such
that {a ∈ A : ∀b ∈ A, a Ri b} = [p− (Ri) , p+ (Ri)] and, for all a, b ∈ [0, 1] , if a <
b ≤ p− (Ri) or p+ (Ri) ≤ b < a, then b Pi a. Let RPL be the set of continuous
single-plateaued preferences over [0, 1] . Berga (1998) characterizes a certain family
of rules as the set of social choice functions that are plateau-only and strategy-proof
on this domain. One can deﬁne a set of target rules as a subfamily of the family
described by Berga. Each target rule is identiﬁed by a parameter a ∈ [0, 1] . For
any population N and any proﬁle of preferences R, let N− (R) be the set of agents
in N whose preferences Ri are such that p+ (Ri) < a, and let N+ (R) be the set of
agents in N whose preferences Ri are such that a < p− (Ri) . If none of these sets is
empty, then the target rule selects a. If N− (R) is not empty, but N+ (R) is, then let
f (R) ≡ max {p− (Ri) : i ∈ N− (R)} . If N+ (R) is not empty, but N− (R) is, then
let f (R) ≡ min {p+ (Ri) : i ∈ N+ (R)} . If both of the sets are empty, the rule select
a. The following result follows immediately from Berga’s Theorem 1, together with
our Corollary 2 and Theorem 1.
25
Corollary 7 The only social choice functions U (RPL)→ [0, 1] that satisfy Pareto-
eﬃciency, population-monotonicity and plateau-only are the social choice functions
that are Pareto-indiﬀerent to a target rule. These are also the only social choice
functions U (RPL) → [0, 1] that satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency, replication-indiﬀerence,
replacement-domination and plateau-only.
The previous domains are all complete. The following is an example of a do-
main that is not complete, but is still weakly complete. This domain was introduced
by Ehlers, Peters and Storcken (2001) and was also studied by Ehlers and Klaus
(2001). Let A be the set of probability distributions on [0, 1] , denoted by Δ (0, 1) .
Each single-peaked preference Ri over (deterministic alternatives of) the segment
naturally extend to incomplete preferences over Δ (0, 1). Let Ri be a complete pref-
erence over deterministic alternatives, and let α, β ∈ Δ(0, 1). Let α Ri β if, for all
weak-upper contour set U for preference Ri, the measure of U under α is greater
or equal than the measure of U under β. In other words, α is weakly preferred to β
under Ri if α weakly ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates β for preference Ri. Fur-
thermore, let α Pi β if, α Ri β and there exists an upper contour set V for preference
Ri such that the measure of V under α is strictly greater than the measure of V
under β. In other words, α is strictly preferred to β under Pi if α strictly ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates β for preference Ri. For any domain of complete prefer-
ences over deterministic alternatives, this deﬁnes a set of admissible preferences
over lotteries, which are incomplete. It is straightforward, however, to prove that
all preferences in this set are weakly complete. Ehlers and Klaus (2001) deﬁne target
rules in this model and show the result stated below, which can also be obtained as a
corollary of a result by Ehlers, Peters and Storcken (2002) on strong-strategy-proof
social choice functions in this model, together with our Theorem 5.
Corollary 8 (Ehlers and Klaus, 2001). The only social choice functions U (RSP )→
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Δ(0, 1) that satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency and population-monotonicity are the target
rules. The only social choice functions U (RSP ) → Δ(0, 1) that satisfy Pareto-
eﬃciency, replication-indiﬀerence and replacement-domination are the target rules.
Interestingly, the target rules in this model are strongly strategy-proof, and
weakly coalition-strategy-proof, but not strongly coalition strategy-proof, which
proves that weak completeness is not a suﬃcient condition for solidarity and Pareto-
eﬃciency (and replication-indiﬀerence) to imply strong coalition-strategy-proofness.
7.2 From solidarity to strategy-proofness?
In some models, the implications of solidarity conditions are well understood, even
though the implications of strategy-proofness are not. The models studied by Gor-
don (2003a, the discrete case), Miyagawa (1998, 2001), and Ehlers (2002, 2003) fall
in this category5. These authors characterize in these models the set of social choice
functions that satisfy population-monotonicity and Pareto-eﬃciency, along with
the subset of social choice functions that satisfy replacement-domination, Pareto-
eﬃciency and replication-indiﬀerence. Corollary 2 tells us that these characteriza-
tions provide a starting point and a hint towards a characterization of strategy-
proof and Pareto-eﬃcient social choice. Indeed, strategy-proofness is population-
monotonicity without represented-types-only.
5Gordon (2003a) studies a model where the set of alternatives is a circle and the set of admissible
preferences R is a ﬁnite set of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Gordon provides characteriza-
tions of solidarity in this model when R has a symmetric structure with respect to the circle and
its cardinality is suﬃciently small. For larger cardinalities, a negative result is obtained. Miyagawa
(1998, 2001) considers a model where two locations have to be chosen from an interval, when agents
have single-peaked preferences over single locations. Preference comparisons of pairs of locations are
solely determined by the preferred location in each pair. Ehlers (2002, 2003) considers a variation
of this model, where preferences over pairs of locations are lexicographic. Preference comparisons
of pairs of locations are determined ﬁrst by the preferred location in each pair. Only in case of a
tie is the second location taken into account.
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8 Axioms independence
In this section, we examine the role of each axiom in Lemma 1, Corollary 2 and 3,
by the means of examples.
Example 1 shows a social choice function that satisﬁes population-monotonicity,
replacement-domination, coalition-strategy-proofness, and anonymity, but not Pareto-
eﬃciency, represented-types-only, nor replication-indiﬀerence. Therefore population-
monotonicity, without Pareto-eﬃciency, does not imply represented-types-only (see
Lemma 2(i)). It is easy to construct a non-anonymous variant of this example.
Example 1: Let A = {a, b} . Let R be the set of strict preferences on A. Let f
be such that for all proﬁle RN , if |N | = 1, then f selects the preferred alternative
of the unique agent in the population. If |N | > 1, then f is constant f (R) = b.
Example 2 shows a social choice function that satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency, coalition-
strategy-proofness, anonymity, and replacement-domination, but not population-
monotonicity, represented-types-only nor replication-indiﬀerence. Therefore Pareto-
eﬃciency, without population-monotonicity, does not imply represented-types-only
(see Lemma 2(i)). The example also shows that Pareto-eﬃciency and replacement-
domination, without replication-indiﬀerence, do not imply represented-types-only,
(see Lemma 2(ii)) nor population-monotonicity (see Theorem 1(ii)). The exam-
ple also shows that coalition-strategy-proofness without represented-types-only does
not imply population-monotonicity (see Corollary 2 (iii)). It is easy to construct a
non-anonymous variant of this example.
Example 2: Let A and R as in Example 1. Let f be such that for all population
N with even cardinality, for all proﬁle R, if all agents unanimously prefer a to b at
R, then let f (R) = a and otherwise, let f (R) = b; and for all population N with
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odd cardinality, for all proﬁle R, if all agents unanimously prefer b to a at R, then
let f (R) = b and otherwise, let f (R) = a.
Example 3 shows a social choice function satisfying Pareto-eﬃciency, replication-
indiﬀerence (therefore anonymity), coalition-strategy-proofness, but not population-
monotonicity, replacement-domination nor represented-types-only. Therefore Pareto-
eﬃciency and replication-indiﬀerence, without replacement-domination, do not im-
ply represented-types-only (see Lemma 2(ii)), nor population-monotonicity (see The-
orem 1(ii)).
Example 3: Let A and R as in Example 1. Let f be such that for all proﬁle RN ,
if, at the proﬁle RN , the cardinality of the set of agents who prefer a is at least
as large as the cardinality of the set of agents that prefer b, then f (RN ) = a, and
otherwise f (RN ) = b.
Example 4 shows a social choice function that satisﬁes replacement-domination,
replication-indiﬀerence (and therefore anonymity), but not population-monotonicity,
Pareto-eﬃciency, represented-types-only nor strategy-proofness. Thus replacement-
domination and replication-indiﬀerence, without Pareto-eﬃciency, do not imply
represented-types-only (see Lemma 2(ii)), population-monotonicity (see Theorem
1(ii)), nor strategy-proofness.(see Corollary 2(ii)).
Example 4: Let A = {a, b, c} . Let R = {Ra, Rc} be the set of strict preferences
on A such that a P a c P a b and c P c a P c b. Let f be such that for all proﬁle
RN , if, at the proﬁle RN , the proportion of agents with preference Ra is exactly
1
2 , then f (RN ) := a, if this proportion is exactly
3
5 , then f (RN ) := c, otherwise
f (RN ) := b.
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Example 5 shows a function that satisﬁes Pareto-eﬃciency, represented-types-
only (therefore also anonymity and replication-indiﬀerence) but not population-
monotonicity, replacement-domination, nor strategy-proofness. Therefore Pareto-
eﬃciency, without population-monotonicity does not imply strategy-proofness (see
Corollary 2(i)). Similarly, the example shows that Pareto-eﬃciency, and replication-
indiﬀerence, without replacement-domination, do not imply strategy-proofness (see
Corollary 2(ii)). Finally, the example also proves that represented-types-only, with-
out strategy-proofness, does not imply population-monotonicity (see Corollary 2(iii)).
Example 5: Let A = [0, 1] . Let R be the set of single-peaked preferences over A
(for a deﬁnition, see section 6). Let f be such that for all proﬁle R, f (R) is the
average of the two most extremes peaks in the proﬁle R.
Example 6 shows a social choice function that satisﬁes population-monotonicity,
replacement-domination, represented-types-only, (therefore replication-indiﬀerence
and anonymity), but not strategy-proofness, nor Pareto-eﬃciency. Thus population-
monotonicity, without Pareto-eﬃciency, does not imply strategy-proofness (see Corol-
lary 2(i)).
Example 6: Let A and R as in Example 1. Let f be such that for all proﬁle R,
if all agents unanimously prefer a to b at R, then let f (R) = b and otherwise, let
f (R) = a.
Example 7 shows a social choice function that satisﬁes replacement-domination
and Pareto-eﬃciency, but not population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, replication-
indiﬀerence ( therefore also not represented-types-only) nor Pareto-eﬃciency. There-
fore replacement-domination and Pareto-eﬃciency, without replication-indiﬀerence,
do not imply strategy-proofness (see Corollary 2(ii)).
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Example 7: Let A = {a, b, c} . Let R = {Ra, Rb, Rc} be the set of strict prefer-
ences on A such that a P a c P a b, b P b a P b c and c P c b P c a. Let f be such that
if all agents in the proﬁle have the same preference Rh, then f (RN ) = h. If at least
preferences Rc and Ra (or all three preferences) are represented at proﬁle RN , then
f (RN ) = a. If preferences Ra and Rb are represented at proﬁle RN , then f (RN ) = b
if |N | = 2 and f (RN ) = a otherwise. If preferences Rb and Rc are represented at
proﬁle RN , then f (RN ) = c if |N | = 2 and f (RN ) = b otherwise.
9 Conclusion
This paper raises mainly two types of open questions for future work.
First, we developed a systematic way to study solidarity in public choice models.
In any new public choice model that anyone could come up with, our results provide
a list of implications that provide a solid starting point towards a characterization
on the basis of solidarity in any such model. In section 7, we have shown that old
and new results on solidarity can be obtained as by-products of results on strategy-
proofness.
An example of a public choice problem that is not well understood, is the model
studied by Ehlers (2002, 2003), on the provision of multiple public goods, when
agents have lexicographic preferences. In these papers, Ehlers provides a complete
answer to the problems we address here, but only for the case of the provision
of two goods. How to extend his results to more goods is not obvious, but our
results provide steps towards this goal. All of our results apply, and yield several
solid starting points. For example, we know that any social choice function that
satisﬁes population-monotonicity and Pareto-eﬃciency admits a status quo point.
In the model with k goods, this means that there exists a vector of k locations that
is always Pareto-dominated by the function, and is selected whenever it is Pareto-
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eﬃcient. We also know that such a function satisﬁes coalition-strategy-proofness and
represented-types-only. A similar remark applies to the model studied by Miyagawa
(1998, 2001).
Second, for public choice models where strategy-proofness is not well understood,
we propose the study of solidarity as a preliminary step, that can potentially suggest
what kind of functions are strategy-proof in these models. For example, in the
model of Ehlers (2002, 2003) with two public goods, the set of Pareto-eﬃcient
and strategy-proof social choice functions is not known. But our Corollary 2 says
that the intersection of this set with the set of rules that satisfy represented-types-
only is exactly the class of functions characterized in Ehlers (2003). Therefore,
Corollary 2 suggests the conjecture that the set of Pareto-eﬃcient and strategy-
proof functions consist of functions resembling those described by Ehlers, but freed
from an obligation to satisfy represented-types-only. A similar remark applies to the
model studied by Miyagawa (1998, 2001) and to any new model of public choice.
In such a model, our work indicated that studying solidarity is a natural starting
point to study strategy-proofness.
Finally, an important question that we leave open is whether anything remains
of our strong implications once our two public choice assumptions are relaxed. Ob-
vious ways to relax these assumptions are the presence of money transfers, or to let
preferences depend on the population, so as to allow phenomena such as ”crowding”.
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